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ABSTRACT 
 
Tax is an obligatory financial contribution that individuals or institutions, as taxpayers, owe to the state 
without any direct benefits.  It is compulsory and is collected under the regulation of law.  The present 
research aims to examine the effectiveness of directors’ supervision and tax aggressiveness in 
diminishing frauds in financial reporting.  The subject of this research is manufacturing companies 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange.  This research using logistic regression analysis. The results of this 
research show that, firstly, effective directors’ supervision has significant influence to diminishing 
fraudulent financial reporting.  Directors, as the leaders of the company, demonstrated that they could 
perform their supervisory function very well.  Secondly, tax aggressiveness has significant influence to 
diminishing fraudulent financial reporting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia implements a self-assessment system which facilitates both individual and 
institutional taxpayers (Rochmat Soemitro, 2014). Some taxpayers abuse this system to avoid 
tax, whether under the letters of the law (tax aggressiveness) or against the taxation regulation.  
They do this by manipulating the company’s taxable profits through legal or illegal taxation 
planning (Frank et al, 2009). Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) (2018) found 
that manufacturing industry suffered the most from fraudulent financial reporting in Asia-
Pacific region.  The industry suffered an average of 500,000 US Dollar (US$ 500,000) loss 
from 17% or 33 cases of fraudulent financial reporting.  
Richard Susilo (2017) noted that a survey conducted by Ernesto Crivelly had found that 
Indonesian companies were ranked 11 of 30 countries in terms of aggressive taxation. These 
companies did not pay their tax to Indonesia Tax Offices, amounting to 6.48 billion US Dollar.  
Imanuel Hakim (2018) argued that there are four sectors of industry in Indonesia that frequently 
avoid tax by transfer pricing. The four sectors are mining industry, plantation industry, 
electronic industry, and automotive industry. Fraudulent financial reporting happens because 
companies attempt to reduce the amount of tax paid.  They can reduce the amount of tax while 
still adhering to tax rules and regulations (tax avoidance) and reduce the amount of tax value 
by not following the tax law (tax evasion) (Brian and Martani, 2014).  Chen et al (2010) noted 
that company owners tend to prefer that the company management performs tax aggressiveness.  
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Tax aggressiveness is an activity aimed to reduce the taxable income (profit) through tax 
planning which may or may not involve both tax evasion and tax avoidance (Frank et al, 2009).  
Even though not all tax reporting aggressiveness is breaking the law, the more opportunities a 
company exploits, the more aggressive the company (Dewi Kartika Sari and Dwi Martani, 
2010). 
Dhaliwal et al (2004) argued that company managers consider the tax department as the 
center of profit who is responsible for increasing the company’s cash flow through aggressive 
tax reporting and income management by estimating their tax expense.  Therefore, consistent 
with this view, it is expected that companies can be aggressive in their financial and tax 
reporting (Frank et al, 2009). This opportunity encourages the managers to exploit complex tax 
evasion strategies to reduce the amount of tax paid and divert the company’s resources, which 
then will be obscured through distorting the financial report (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).  
Frank et al (2009) proved that tax aggressiveness has positive correlation with financial 
reporting, in which tax aggressiveness implies obscured information and, in turn, suggests a 
fraud.  However, Blaylock at al (2012) provided a contrary evidence to the findings of Frank et 
al (2009), stating that aggressive financial reporting tends to also pursue aggressive tax 
reporting. 
In running a company, a supervisory function is critical. This function is usually 
performed by the board of directors. The Public Oversight Board (1995) in the United States of 
America argued that the board of directors plays a significant role in financial reporting process.  
Board of directors serves to supervise and monitor the process of financial reporting to ensure 
high quality financial report. Corporate governance, which describes the procedures of 
improving the quality of financial report, emphasized the board of directors’ roles in reducing 
profit (income) manipulation and in ensuring that the report provides accurate information 
about the company’s operation. 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) Agency theory or also commonly called contracting theory, 
explains the relationship between agent and principal. "Principals" are defined as shareholders 
or parties who mandate agents to act on behalf of the principal. Agent is the management that 
manages the company or party who is given the mandate by the principal to run the company. 
The main objective of the company is to maximize shareholder prosperity. For this reason, 
managers appointed by shareholders must act in the interests of shareholders. This conflict 
occurs because of differences in interests between management and shareholders. Because 
conflicts often occur, these problems are often referred to as agency problems. 
 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
AICPA (2002) defined fraudulent financial reporting as intentional misstatements or 
omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements designed to deceive financial 
statement users. Meanwhile, ACFE (2010) described fraudulent financial reporting as a 
deliberate act of corporate executive on material information that aims to obscure the real 
financial condition of the company and to profit the parties committing the fraud, which may 
be financial or non-financial in nature.  
 
Effectiveness of Directors’ Supervision on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Board of directors is a basic mechanism of effective corporate governance, both in public 
and private companies, which serves to control the management’s actions and prioritize the 
stakeholders’ interest (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Carcello et al. (2002) suggested that more 
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experienced members of board of directors are more likely to demand for high quality audit. In 
addition, directors with good financial/accounting skills are able to understand and handle the 
problems in financial reporting. 
 Beasley (1996) argued that among the board of directors’ crucial competencies is their 
knowledge about the company’s affairs and about management process, which they need to 
perform their monitoring function. In addition, Cadbury (1992) suggested that adequate 
educational background of the board of directors will determine the quality and skills of the 
board. Their knowledge and information processing will affect the depth of monitoring or 
supervision that the board provides. Members of board of directors with good educational 
background and sufficient experiences will have greater and wider insight and deeper analysis, 
which in turn will add to his or her credibility in performing his or her supervisory roles. 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) argued that members of the board of directors who possess 
international experiences are rare individuals with added value and unmatched characteristics 
who can contribute to the competitive advantages of any company that hire them.  Members of 
board of directors may gather international experiences from overseas placement or from their 
experience of working with foreign companies. These individuals will be evident in 
organizational management and in financial information and financial reporting, as well as in 
monitoring activities that foreign companies may perform on the company. A company’s habit 
may be affected by the culture, rules, laws, and regulations of the nation in which the company 
operates. Exposure to foreign settings and experiences in foreign companies will help the 
members of board of directors to manage the complexity of income management practices.  
Simultaneously, with international experiences that differ from local experiences, it is believed 
that such members of the board will benefit the effort of promoting and implementing 
prevention mechanism in income management more proactively.  
Moreover, Cardbury (1992) recommended that the effectiveness of board of directors’ 
supervisory role is depended on the size of the board or the number of its members (big or small 
board), how active the members are in performing their roles, and the frequency of their 
meetings. 
H1:  Directors’ Supervision have a significant influence to Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
 
Effects of Tax Aggressiveness on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Balakrishnan et al (2012) defined tax aggressiveness as manipulation of taxable income 
to reduce it through tax planning which may or may not be considered tax evasion or tax 
avoidance.  Frank et al (2009) argued that tax aggressiveness is an activity aimed to reduce the 
taxable income through tax planning which may or may not involve both tax evasion and tax 
avoidance. Even though not all tax reporting aggressiveness is breaking the law, the more 
opportunities a company exploits, the more aggressive the company is considered to be.  
When making decision to do tax aggressiveness, the decision makers (managers) will 
consider the benefits and disadvantages of that action.  There are three benefits of tax 
aggressiveness that will be outlined here.  (1) The benefit of tax saving, in which the company 
pays less tax to the state and in turn increases the portion of cash that owners/stakeholders will 
gain.  (2) (Direct and indirect) benefit for managers, who receive compensation or incentive 
from the owner/stakeholders for the tax aggressiveness they do. (3) The benefit of opportunities 
for managers to do rent extraction (Chen et al, 2010).  
The disadvantages of tax aggressiveness are, among others, the possibility of the company 
receiving penalties/sanctions from tax authorities and the risk of decrease in company’s stocks.  
It is possible that the company’s stocks decrease in value because stakeholders know that 
managers perform tax aggressiveness through rent extraction (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).  
Companies assume that tax is an expense.  Thus, they need strategies to mitigate tax 
expense (Mangoting, 1999 in Ida Farida et al, 2018).  Companies are willing to report higher 
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values of tax to achieve certain financial goals (Hafiza et al, 2016).  Erickson et al (2004) 
showed that companies are willing to pay tax for technical income to reduce the chance of 
identification scam in their financial report. Erickson et al investigated 27 companies that 
presented their financial reports as a consequence of accounting/financial fraud allegations, 
which included false reporting and bogus income, false inventory, and financial scams to bloat 
their assets, income, and net profit, from 1999 to 2002. 
Dyreng (2009 in Ida Farida et al, 2018) discovered that companies make a higher choice 
of financial reporting when they are facing a violation of debt agreement (IOU). They pay the 
tax for this income to avoid expenses pertaining to the debt-agreement violation.  Frank et al 
(2009) proposed that companies that perform financial reporting fraud are also involved in tax 
aggressiveness. They found that there is a significant and positive correlation between 
accounting/financial fraud and tax aggressiveness. On the other hand, Lennox et al (2013) 
provided evidence that companies that are tax-aggressive tend to commit financial reporting 
fraud. 
Sukotjo and Soenarno (2018) revealed that tax aggressiveness is an act of "gray areas" 
that can be considered illegal activities. In other words, the more aggressive corporate tax 
planning indicates the more management is cheating financial reporting. Management hides 
actual transactions, making financial statements more beautiful. Companies with higher tax 
aggressiveness have annual reports that are more difficult to read. Lo et al (2017) point out that 
more and more companies are managing their revenues resulting in very complex financial 
statements. 
H2: Tax Aggressiveness have a significant influence to Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The population in this study are manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange, with the target population in this study being manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2017, where the target population according to Sekaran and 
Bougie (2013: 245) is defined as part of the element, geographical circles, and times. The 
number of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange is 155 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Samples according to 
Sekaran and Bougie (2010: 263) are explained as part of the population. The sampling method 
used is Propability sampling. The technique used is Random Sampling. The sample size can be 
determined using the formula from Taro Yamane or Slovin as follows: 
N 
    n  =  
            N.d2 + 1 
 
Where is:       n  = The sample size sought 
N = Total Population 
d2   = Precision set at 10% 
Based on the formula above, in this study the sample size is 
𝑛 =
155
155.(0,1)2+1
  =
155
2.55
 =  60,78 
n =  61 manufacturing companies 
 
The data analysis technique of this research used logistic regression analysis. The use 
of logistic regression is because the dependent variable is fraudulent financial reporting on a 
nominal scale. This analysis is to test whether the probability of a dependent variable can be 
predicted with the independent variable. Hypothesis testing is done by an analysis of absolute 
value differences. The regression equation used is as follows:  
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Ln   FFR  = α + β1Kom + β2TAX + εi 
            1 – FFR 
Keterangan: 
FFR : fraudulent financial reporting 
Kom : Independent directors 
TAX : tax aggressiveness 
 
 
The Dependent Variable in the present study is fraudulent financial reporting, with the 
number of fraudulent financial reporting in a year as the indicator. The Independent Variables 
in this study are the independent directors and the tax aggressiveness. Directors supervision 
variable is measured using three dimensions: 1) Competency, measured based on two 
indicators, i.e. Skills in accounting/finance/auditing and International experience; 2) Interaction 
with board of directors and committees, measured using the proxy of Frequency of meeting in 
a year; 3) Human resources, measured using the proxy of Number of independent directors.  
Tax aggressiveness variable is measured using Effective Tax Rates (ETR), i.e. by comparing 
the income tax expense to income before tax. 
 
Table 1 
Operational Variable 
Variable Dimension Indicator Scale 
 
Effectiveness of 
Directors 
Supervision (X1) 
Competence 
1. Accounting/ Financial/ 
Auditing Expertise 
2. International Experience 
Ordinal 
Interaction with 
Directors and 
Committees 
Frequency of meetings held 
during the year 
Ordinal 
 
Human Resources 
Independent Commissioners 
Owned 
Ordinal 
 
Aggressive Tax 
(X2) 
Effective Tax rates 
(ETR) 
Income Tax Expanse 
Pre-Tax Income 
Ratio 
Financial Reporting 
Fraud (Y) 
Disclosure of 
Financial Reporting 
Fraud 
The amount of Financial 
Reporting Fraud Reported 
 for a year 
Nominal 
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The logistic regression test must be fulfill the several tests. The first test of the feasibility 
of the model using Hosmer and Lemeshow's Goodness of Fit Test which was measured by Chi-
square value. Hosmer and Lemeshow's Goodness of Fit Test tests the null hypothesis that 
empirical data matches or matches the model (there is no difference between the model and the 
data so the model can be said to be Fit). The calculation results show that the significance level 
is above 0.05 (ie, the significance is 0.365 and the chi-square value is 8.735), which means that 
the model is good. Testing the hypothesis in this study using logistic regression with a 
significance level of 5% or 0.05. The logistic regression equation in this research study is: 
 
Ln =  FFR = 11,951 - 3,320Kom + 8,979TAX 
             1 – FFR 
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Table 2 
Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
No Hyphotesis B Significant Exp (B) Hasil 
1 The Effect of Directors’ 
Supervision Effectiveness on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
-3,320 0,010 0,036 Accepted 
2 The Effects of Tax Aggressiveness 
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
8,979 0,001 7.937,999 Accepted 
 
The directors supervision variable shows a negative coefficient B of-3.320 with a 
significance level of 0.010<0.05, which means that the directors supervision variable has a 
significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. The odds ratio for directors supervision is 
0.036. The coefficient B is negative and means that, if the other independent variables are 
considered constant, then the probability of a company that has directors supervision of 
fraudulent financial reporting is 0.036 times lower. 
The tax aggressiveness variable shows a positive coefficient B of 8.979 with a 
significance level of 0.000<0.05 which means that the tax aggressiveness variable has a 
significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting. The odds ratio for directors supervision is 
7,937.9999. Because the coefficient B is positive and means that, if other independent variables 
are considered fixed, then the probability of companies that have tax aggressiveness towards 
fraudulent financial reporting is 7,037.9999 times higher. 
 
The Effect of Directors’ Supervision Effectiveness on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
Carcello et al. (2002) suggested that more experienced members of board of directors are 
more likely to demand for high quality audit. In addition, directors with good 
financial/accounting skills are able to understand and handle the problems in financial 
reporting. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) argued that members of the board of directors who 
possess international experiences are rare individuals with added value and unmatched 
characteristics who can contribute to the competitive advantages of any company that hire them.  
Members of board of directors may gather international experiences from overseas placement 
or from their experience of working with foreign companies. These individuals will be evident 
in organizational management and in financial information and financial reporting, as well as 
in monitoring activities that foreign companies may perform on the company.   
A company’s habit may be affected by the culture, rules, laws, and regulations of the 
nation in which the company operates. Exposure to foreign settings and experiences in foreign 
companies will help the members of board of directors to manage the complexity of income 
management practices. Simultaneously, with international experiences that differ from local 
experiences, it is believed that such members of the board will benefit the effort of promoting 
and implementing prevention mechanism in income management more proactively. Moreover, 
the higher frequency of director meetings between board of directors and committees will also 
reduce the level of fraud in financial reporting. It is because the meetings will enable directors 
to have deeper understanding of the problems in their companies and to provide appropriate 
solution (Cadbury, 1992). 
 
The Effects of Tax Aggressiveness on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. 
This is in line with Dyreng’s (2009 in Ida Farida et al, 2018) findings that companies 
make a higher choice of financial reporting when they are facing a violation of debt agreement.  
They pay the tax for this income to avoid expenses pertaining to the debt-agreement violation.  
Frank et al (2009) proposed that companies that perform financial reporting fraud are also 
involved in tax aggressiveness. They found that there is a significant and positive correlation 
between accounting/financial fraud and tax aggressiveness. On the other hand, Lennox et al 
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(2013) provided evidence that companies that are tax-aggressive tend to commit financial 
reporting fraud. 
   
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTION 
 
Based on the phenomenon in the field, the formulation of problems, the hypotheses, and 
the findings, the Effectiveness of directors’ supervision has significant effect on fraudulent 
financial reporting.  This shows that directors who possess skills in accounting/finance/auditing 
and international experience can reduce frauds in financial reporting.  In addition, the higher 
frequency of directors meeting will enable directors to have deeper understanding of the 
problems in their companies and to provide appropriate solution. Tax aggressiveness has 
significant effect on fraudulent financial reporting.  This shows that companies make higher 
financial reporting choice when they are facing a violation of debt agreement.  They pay the tax 
for this income to avoid expenses pertaining to the debt-agreement violation. This reserach has 
limitations, where the results of logistic regression testing produce a coefficient of 
determination (R-Square) which is still low at 58.5% so that there are still 41.5% of other 
explanatory variables outside this study. Based on these limitations, for further research it is 
recommended to add other variables that have an influence on fraudulent financial reporting 
such as the audit committee change variables, ethics, and others. 
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